Chapter 4, Secular Criticism and Secular Studies:
Non-religious Perspectives within the American Secular University, or Secular Attempts to Participate in a Discourse of the Secular
Chapter 3 of this dissertation presented the state of the discourse of the secular and/or secularism as it has existed in the American academy through the last half of the 20th century and as it continues to exist today. It described how religious voices hegemonically shape a too generally accepted understanding of the secular and/or secularism within the academy, and beyond that through the larger American cultural and political world. It introduced many of the figures who worked to shape this discourse in a significantly anti-secular way. In doing these things it demonstrated from a Foucauldian perspective the powers which most substantially shape discourses attached to the secular and/or secularism, and following from this described, as Wittgenstein might, how these terms have come to be used in shaping understandings of their meanings.[1]
This chapter will present the efforts made by two men, Edward Said and Phil Zuckerman, to detach the secular and/or secularism from anti-secular discourses as those presented by the men in the previous chapter. It will begin non-chronologically with a discussion of Zuckerman’s research and writing, and show how this work led to the partial development of a Secular Studies program at Pitzer College in Pitzer, California, today. It will then move back to examine Said’s work in his development of Secular Criticism as a method to be used as a part of literary theory and criticism. Zuckerman’s work, as a sociologist, accepts a definition of the secular which conforms most completely to that presented within a discourse of the secular as it has been shaped by religious voices, as those described in the previous chapter. He sees secular identity as being defined most completely, and exclusively, through a relationship and opposition to the religious. He accepts this portion of the anti-secular discourse, but does not at all accept that other part of the discourse which sees secularism as being morally, aesthetically, or significantly inferior to the religious. His research deconstructs each of these accusations as they function within anti-secular discourse, and works to portray secularists as living full, meaningful ethical lives equal to or perhaps significantly superior to their religious peers. Said, quite differently, works to reshape an understanding of the secular which in a manner quite completely apart from a discourse which limits it to being nothing more than an opposition to religion. His work emphasizes the etymological roots of the secular which describe it as being of the world. He sees criticism as necessarily needing to remain attached to and a part of the world, the human world, the physical world, and criticizes critical methodologies which see the text as existing as apart from, or transcendent to, the world we all share. He uses the word “religion” to describe visions of the world which separate the reader from a sensible understanding of the real world, but does not limit the religious to being a thing necessarily attached to a belief in God, or the supernatural. This moves him completely away from a discourse of the secular as that described in the previous chapter, separating it from all limitations imposed upon it by the anti-secular religious voices which shape that discourse. Significantly, like Zuckerman, he portrays the secular in a connotatively positive way, and instead sees religion as functioning to promote conflict and disharmony in the world, embedding much of this in a vision of religion which sees it, in congruence with his orientalism, as promoting exclusion and destroying the possibility of creating larger, more peaceful, effective, communities.
This chapter will not examine New Atheism in tandem with Zuckerman and Said. It will not do this because the “new atheists” did not necessarily work to influence a discussion of the secular in the American, or European, university systems. Their work, their texts, have been largely excluded from classrooms in congruence with the anti-secular discourse which pejoratively presented them as being angry, militant, aggressive and such. They have been excluded from having much direct influence within the American university system; but largely that was not their goal. They participated substantially in work in other fields and presented their “militant atheism” as a part of public discourse, not through a motivated desire to influence or reshape pedagogy in the American academy.[2] Beyond this too, like Zuckerman, they largely participated in a discourse which conflates secularism with atheism, the secularist with the atheist, and while not accepting the anti-secular prejudice contained within that discourse, continued to participate in it.
In 2009 Zuckerman published “Atheism, Secularity, and Well-Being: How the Findings of Social Science Counter Negative Stereotypes and Assumptions” working to battle the prejudiced assumptions contained within descriptions of the secular as presented by the academics in the previous chapter and as held by substantial portions of the general population. He challenges propositions which describe secularists as living lives that lack morality, meaning, value, and pleasure. His work academically fits wholly within the field of sociology and his research is built of quantifiable data. From this position he asserts that the claims made by the others mentioned above lack any real credibility or even that they are verifiably false. He goes so far as to not only defend the secular against such attacks, but instead suggests that, perhaps, religiosity, more accurately, works to create cultures and lives that lack effective moral, aesthetic, and affective groundings.
In the introduction to his text Zuckerman asks, “Is the widespread dislike, disapproval of, and general negativity towards atheists warranted, or is it a case of unsubstantiated prejudice?” He goes beyond this to propose that, “maybe secular, non-believing men and women aren’t so unsavory, wicked, or despicable after all”, and that, “perhaps, there are some positive attributes correlated with secularity, such as lower levels of prejudice and ethnocentrism, or greater support for gender equality.” Beyond this he suggests that, perhaps “societies with higher percentages of secular people are actually more healthy, humane, and happy than those with higher percentages of religious people.” He closes his introduction with a description of the text’s methodology, framing his work as a sociologist to pursue answers to these questions. “To explore these matters, we need to consider what social science actually reveals about people who don’t believe in God or are irreligious, and examine just what empirically observable patterns emerge when considering the real lives, opinions, and overall state of well-being of atheists and secular people.”
His text cites sources which on the one hand examine the prejudices which members of the general population hold in regard to an understanding of secular people, and on the other hand examine the actual realities which shape the lives of secular people. His discussion of anti-secular bias refers to numerous studies which show that “a negative view of atheists… in the United States… is quite pervasive”, referring to one specific study, a “Religion and Public Life Survey”, which shows that “54 percent of Americans have an unfavorable opinion of atheists” and another which states that “most Americans would not vote for non-religious presidential candidates.” Significantly, he referred to “One laboratory study,” which, “found that people gave lower priority to patients with atheist or agnostic views than to Christian patients when asked to rank them on a waiting list to receive a kidney.” This all harkens back to John Locke’s assertion, within his essay directed toward a discussion of tolerance, in which he states that, “Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God”, and that, “Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.” Three sections contained within Zuckerman’s text work to challenge or deconstruct the validity or credibility of these anti-secular/anti-atheistic prejudices. The three sections include: 1) “Values, Beliefs, Opinions, and Worldviews”, 2) “Criminality and Moral Conduct”, and 3) “Life Satisfaction and Psychological Well-Being.” Two more sections, 1) “Family and Children”, and 2) “Sex and Sexuality”, work to develop a more complete understanding of the personal lives of secular people; and finally, before the conclusion the penultimate section, “National and State Comparisons”, does just what its title suggests, comparing secular nations and states with more religious nations and states, showing how each functions legally, economically, and politically.
Within “Values, Beliefs, Opinions, and Worldviews”, Zuckerman challenges the recurring Christian assertion that atheists, because they do not believe in God, believe in “nothing”. In opposition to this assertion he states that, “People can reject religion and still maintain strong beliefs. He refers to, and cites, “numerous studies” which, reveal that atheists and secular people most certainly maintain strong values, beliefs, and opinions”, and that, more significantly, when we actually compare the values and beliefs of atheists and secular people to those of religious people, the former are markedly less nationalistic, less prejudiced, less anti-Semitic, less racist, less dogmatic, less ethnocentric, less close-minded, and less authoritarian.” Politically, his research suggests that, “atheist and secular people are much more likely to be registered Independent than the general American population”, that, “irreligiosity is strongly and consistently correlated with liberal, progressive, or left-wing political perspectives”, and that, “when compared to various religious groups, nonreligious Americans are the most politically tolerant, supporting the extension of civil liberties to dissident groups.” This section goes on to assert that, “As for gender equality and women’s rights, atheists and secular people are quite supportive”, citing “Recent studies”, which, “show that secular individuals are much more supportive of gender equality than religious people, less likely to endorse conservatively traditional views concerning women’s roles, and when compared with various religious denominations, ‘Nones’ possess the most egalitarian outlook of all concerning women’s rights.” The section goes on to cite studies which show that, “when compared with the religious, non-religious people are far more accepting of homosexuality and supportive of gay rights and gay marriage”, and that non-religious people “are far less likely to be homophobic or harbor negative attitudes towards homosexuals” than their religious peers. Beyond these, Zuckerman asserts, in this section, that 1) non-religious people showed less support, and more opposition to the US invasion of Iraq, 2) that they are “far less supportive” of the death penalty, 3) that, in general, in regard to the treatment of prisoners within the criminal justice system, “secular people are much less supportive of retribution and are less likely to favor harsh/draconian sentencing than religious people”, 4) that “secular, religiously unaffiliated Americans are the group least supportive of the governmental use of torture”, 5) that they more frequently supported doctor assisted suicide and stem cell research, and 6) “finally, secular people are much more likely to support the legalization of marijuana than religious people.” He closes the section by arguing that assertions which describe secularists, atheists, and non-believers of living lives empty of any significant values and beliefs not only fail to describe the reality of their world views, but, more than that, that he “would go farther”, and “argue that a strong case could be made that atheists and secular people actually possess a stronger or more ethical sense of social justice than their religious peers.”
In the next section, “Criminality and Moral Conduct”, which relies very much upon a methodology, similar to that in the later section, which compares secular and non-secular nations and states, Zuckerman challenges the Christian assertion, as noted above, in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, that the absence of a belief in God, provides no foundation for a moral life. He states that, “In many people’s minds … atheism is equated with lawlessness and wickedness, while religion is equated with morality and law-abiding behavior.” He follows this with the question, “Does social science support this position?” He cites contradictory studies which on the one hand “have found that religion does inhibit criminal behavior” and on the other which “have actually found that religiosity does not have a significant effect on inhibiting criminal behavior.” He chooses to agree with Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, who decided that, “The claim that atheists are somehow more likely to be immoral has long been disproven by systematic studies.” (He makes the mistake here of, too much, conflating criminality with morality.) He, perhaps, corrects that mistake, somewhat, when he follows this conflation with a comparison of the situation in which secular youth are more likely to break the law in regards to alcohol and illegal drug use, but, in which “no evidence shows” that secular people are more likely to commit “serious or violent crimes, such as murder.” He doesn’t quite say that religious people are more likely to commit more serious and violent crimes, but he does inform the reader, in this context, that “only 0.2 percent of prisoners in the USA are atheists — a major under-representation.” He follows these claims by beginning to comparatively contrast the abundance of criminal misconduct present in secular nations and states with the abundance present in more religious nations and states. The studies he cites indicate that murder rates are higher in religious nations and states than they are in secular nations and states. “Furthermore”, he cites Census Bureau statistics, which demonstrate that “rates of most violent crimes tend to be lower in the less religious states and higher in the most religious states.” He ends the comparative work in this section by citing work which demonstrates that, “finally, of the top 50 safest cities in the world, nearly all are in relatively non-religious countries, and of the eight cities within the United States that make the safest-city list, nearly all are located in the least religious regions of the country.” He ends this section with a discussion of statistics which describe religious people as being more generous in their willingness to donate portions of their income to charitable causes by asserting that the individual generosity attributed to religious folks contrasts with the promotion of collaborative social generosity present within secular nations and states. He supports his position by asserting that “it should be noted that it is the most secular democracies on earth — such as Scandinavia — that donate the most money and supportive aid, per capita, to poorer nations.” Finally, to close this section, he moves away from a discussion of differences between nations and states, and ends with reference to two studies “of heroic altruism during the Holocaust” which “found that the more secular people were, the more likely they were to rescue and help persecuted Jews.”
The final section designed specifically to challenge anti-secular propositions, “Life Satisfaction and Psychological Well-being”, addresses a description of the lives of secular people that sees them as being overwrought with anxiety, depression, and other social and psychological hardships. In this section he does not present research which substantially counters the claims put forth by religious people in their descriptions of the non-religious. Instead he begins by listing numerous studies which achieve completely contradictory results. “Some studies suggest that religiosity is positively correlated with positive mental health outcomes … while others find no such correlation.” One researcher “has argued that non-religious people are more likely to have psychological problems”, while another “has argued that secular people are actually psychologically healthier than religious people.” “Many studies report that religiosity is correlated with reduced levels of depression, and yet others suggest that religiosity can have a negative or no influence on depression.” “Some studies indicate that secular people are less happy than religious people … yet international comparisons show that it is the most secular nations in the world that report the highest levels of happiness among their populations.” Zuckerman continues like this with numerous examples that demonstrate a lack of definitive authority in regards to determining the differences in psychological well-being between believers and non-believers. Following this list of contradictions, though, he does assert that, “While acknowledging the many disagreements and discrepancies above, the fact still remains that a preponderance of studies do indicate that secular people don’t seem to fare as well as their religious peers when it comes to selected aspects of psychological well-being.” He followed this statement with a list, like that above, citing sources and describing, the conclusions that followed from their research. One group of studies “found that religious beliefs correlate with a sense of life-satisfaction and well-being”, another study “found that religious faith is correlated with hope and optimism”, another reported “that religious people have a better time adjusting to and coping with sad or difficult life events than secular people”, another similar study reported “that religion is beneficial for people dealing with chronic illness or the death of a loved one.” This list continued, as the one above, citing numerous examples which conform to the other listed. Following this second list he does state some objection to the consistency of its validity, stating that “it should be pointed out that some have vigorously refuted such sweeping conclusions, arguing that the link between religiosity and positive health outcomes is grossly exaggerated” and adding, from a particularly American perspective, that “there is certainly the possibility that because being non-religious in the United States makes one a member of a widely un-liked, distrusted, and stigmatize minority, this could take a psychological toll on the mental health and sense of well-being of atheists and secular people, who may suffer from a sense of isolation, alienation, or rejection from family, colleagues, or peers.” He ends this section with a discussion of suicide, agreeing with his non-secular peers, that suicide rates in the US are higher for secular people than for their religious peers.
As for suicide … regular church-attending Americans clearly have lower rates than non-attenders, although this correlation has actually not been found in other nations. Of the current top-ten nations with the highest rates of suicide, most are relatively secular. But it is worth noting that eight of these top-ten are post-Soviet countries, suggesting that decades of totalitarianism, depressed economies, and a lack of basic human freedoms may be more significant in explaining the high rates of suicide than low levels of God-belief.
The two sections which follow this, “Family and Children” and “Sex and Sexuality”, describe aspects of the lives of secular people and how these aspects differ from those who are religious. Unlike the three previous sections these two do not work, so much, to counter prejudices and stereotypes about secular people, but instead they present information which neither group would find, or wish to promote as, inaccurate. It discusses marriage, divorce, and aspects of child raising, presenting things most simply as statistical information. It does the same in regards to sexual practices and preferences. Most all of the information shows secular identity as being more liberal and progressive than religious identities, reinforcing accepted understandings instead of challenging or deconstructing assumptions or prejudices. The details contained within these sections certainly can be specifically informative, and some may fail to completely fit assumptions that the reader may have, but mostly they conform to generally accepted understandings as they function within American and Western culture.
[1] An addendum to Chapter 3 is presented at the end of this dissertation, which moves away from a presentation of discourse and how it is shaped by power and use. The addendum, instead, examines how secularization grew within the American academy apart from any discursive influences, arising instead, coincidentally as a product of specialization within the American university system through the end of the 19th century and into the beginning of the 20th century. As such this addendum challenges anti-secular positions which see secularization as following from a secular desire to limit and restrict religious freedom, and instead portrays secularization as occurring more as a product of other motivations in the academy. This alternative description of the secularization of the academy shows how incorrect present understandings of the secular distort understandings of the secular in history, as they work to coercively determine understandings of the secular in the present, modern, academy and world.
[2]Dennet’s research and publishing can be seen, more so than the others, as working within the academy to influences discourses and understanding of the secular, in ways that could accurately be interpreted as working within the academy in a manner quite similar to Zuckerman and/or Said.
